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CHURCH LOBBYING: THE
LEGAL CONSTRAINTS
JOHN D. ALDOCK*
INTRODUCTION
According to H. L. Mencken, the first use of the term "lobby" in a
political sense was recorded in 1829 when it was applied in the phrase
"lobby agent" to the hired privilege-seekers who had begun to frequent the
legislative corridors at Albany. Soon thereafter, Thurlow Weed and others
gave to lobbying professional status, established method, and a persisting
notoriety that it has had ever since.'
Despite the pejorative connotations of the term, lobbying-the efforts
of organized interests to influence government policy-is an inseparable
part of the political process and is in part encompassed in the right "to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances" guaranteed by the
first amendment to the United States Constitution. While religious organi-
zations have always taken a low profile in their lobbying activities, we all
know that church groups have in the past and will continue in the future
to attempt to influence legislation bearing on matters that concern their
organizations and their members. Indeed, the Chief Justice, writing for the
Court in Walz v. Tax Commission,2 said: "Adherents of particular faiths
and individual churches frequently take strong positions on public issues
including . . .vigorous advocacy of legal or constitutional positions. Of
course, churches as much as secular bodies and private citizens have their
right."
You have been informed by Robert Lynch about the extensive lobby-
ing activities contemplated by the National Committee for the Human
Life Amendment (NCHLA). As a result of the same considerations that
brought that organization into being, I suspect that many of your Bishops
will be asking you for advice on what they can and cannot do in this area,
and for some of you this may be a new area of concern. What I hope to do
is to briefly chart out what I see as the relevant considerations and legal
limitations on church legislative activities.
The major legal constraints on church activity in this area are, it
seems to me, in two forms: (1) those in the Internal Revenue Code which
*Shea & Gardner, Washington, D.C.; Former Assistant United States Attorney, District of
Columbia.
E. LANE, LOBBYING AND THE LAw 19 (1964).
2 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1969).
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condition the tax exemption of a religious organization; and (2) those
embodied in the federal and state statutes that regulate legislative or
lobbying activity.
TAX CONSIDERATIONS
It is my understanding that all of the dioceses are tax exempt organi-
zations under section 501(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code.' That section
exempts from federal taxation:
(3) Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation,
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing
for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of
cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to
the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of
the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting,
to influence legislation, and which does not participate in, o intervene in
(including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political cam-
paign on behalf of any candidate for public office.
The key language, of course, is "no substantial part of the activities of
which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence
legislation." The qualification of charities to receive contributions which
their donors may deduct for federal income tax purposes is limited by an
identical statutory provision.5 And the statutes governing the estate and
gift tax deductions for charitable contributions contain the same limita-
tion.'
The proviso against substantial legislative activities was written into
the Internal Revenue Code in 1934. In part the Code provision was a
reaction to Judge Hand's decision in Slee v. Commissioner.7 In that case
the court held that the American Birth Control League was not entitled
to a charitable exemption because the fact that it disseminated propa-
ganda to legislators and to the public aimed at the repeal of laws prevent-
ing birth control, made its purpose not "exclusively" charitable, educa-
tional, or scientific. The further limitation on exempt status under section
501(c)(3) against participation or intervention in political campaigns on
behalf of candidates for public office was added to the Code in 1954.
The policy behind these limitations is that the government should be
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c)(3).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. § 170(c)(2)(D).
Id. §§ 2055(a)(2), 2106(a)(2)(A)(ii), 2522(a)(2). It should be noted that bills are now pend-
ing to amend these sections of the Code. One bill, H.R. 12037, introduced by Congressman
Conable, would put a $500,000 limit on lobbying activities (broadly defined) by tax exempt
organizations. Churches are excluded from the bill as introduced and would continue to be
governed by the provisions in the present Code.
1 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930).
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neutral in political affairs and that substantial activities directed to at-
tempts to influence legislation should not be subsidized by the treasury.8
Despite the fact that the proviso against substantial legislative activ-
ity has been part of our law for more than 30 years, it has never really been
defined by the IRS or by the courts. The Treasury regulations dealing with
the legislative activity limitation contained in section 501(c)(3) state inter
alia that an organization is not operated exclusively for exempt purposes
if it is an "action organization" as defined in the regulations. They then
go on to define "action" organization in the terms of the statute as one
where "a substantial part of its activities is attempting to influence legisla-
tion by propaganda or otherwise."' Not surprisingly, the Senate Finance
Committee in 1969 observed that "the standards as to the permissible level
of activities under present law are so vague as to encourage subjective
application of the sanction . . .,10
Not only does there exist no ready quantitative guide as to what per-
centage constitutes a "substantial part of the activities" of an organiza-
tion, but some courts have eschewed a percentage test on this question
entirely.
In the recent case of Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v.
United States," the Tenth Circuit stated:
The political activities of an organization must be balanced in the context
of the objectives and circumstances of the organization to determine whether
a substantial part of its activities was to influence . . . legislation. . . .A
percentage test to determine whether the activities were substantial obscures
the complexity of balancing the organization's activities in relation to its
objectives and circumstances.2
The court observed that the activities prohibited by section 501(c)(3) con-
stituted "an essential part of the program of Christian Echoes" and that
such activities "were not incidental, but were substantial and continu-
ous."'" In that case the record showed that more than 50% of its gross
receipts was devoted to attempts to influence legislation and to participate
in political campaigns. Accordingly, Christian Echoes was found to be not
entitled to the exemption.
I Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 854 (10th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973). See also Commarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 512
(1959).
I Tress. Regs. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii) (1974). The regulations define "legislation" very
broadly and include constitutional amendments. The regulations also state that an organiza-
tion will be regarded as attempting to influence legislation if the organization "(a) Contacts,
or urges the public to contact, members of a legislative body for the purpose of proposing,
supporting or opposing legislation; or (b) Advocates the adoption or rejection of legislation."
11 S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1969).
470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
12 Id. at 855.
' Id. at 855-56.
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In Seasongood v. Commissioner,4 however, a Good Government
League was held qualified under section 501(c)(3) where "something less
than 5% of the time and effort of the League was devoted to the activities
that the Tax Court found to be 'political.' "I' In the few cases in which
courts have found that a substantial part of an organization's activities
have been political, they have done so upon observing that legislative and
political goals were the principal purpose for the organization's existence.
Thus in League of Women Voters v. United States," the court held that
"the influencing of legislation is the League's main purpose and reason for
being." And in Krohn v. United States," the court held that a medical
society had engaged substantially in noncharitable political activities be-
cause "it would not be satisfying its original purposes if it were not seeking
to promote the welfare of the profession and the welfare of its individual
members" and "much of its activity has taken this form."' 8
Another recent case of some interest is "Americans United," Inc. v.
Walters," in which the IRS had revoked a ruling holding Protestants and
Other Americans for Separation of Church and State exempt under section
501(c)(3) and qualified to receive deductible contributions under section
170(c)(2), basing the revocation on the organization's legislative activity.
To the court of appeals, Americans United argued that the Service's
action constituted unconstitutional discrimination against it because
larger charities, with more extensive programs of exempt activities, could
carry on the same quantum of legislative activity without loss of their
entitlement to receive deductible contributions. The court held that the
contention presented "substantial constitutional questions" and re-
manded the case to the district court with instructions to convene a three-
judge panel. In discussing this issue Judge Wilkey, concurring, stated:
In short, it is certainly arguable that small groups are not being treated
differently by § 501(c)(3) because they are small, but because they are ob-
viously operating for a different purpose if they devote their comparatively
small funds on a much different proportionate basis to propaganda for legis-
lation."
This may well be an argument a diocese would make if faced with criticism
14 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955).
" Id. at 912.
180 F. Supp. 379, 383 (Ct. Cl. 1960). See also Kuper v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 562 (3rd
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 920 (1964) (also involving the League of Women Voters).
17 246 F. Supp. 341 (D. Colo. 1965).
"1 Id. at 349. See also Hammerstein v. Kelley, 349 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1965); Haswell v. United
States, 62 Private Fnds. Rpts. 9897, 9903 (Ct. Cl. Oct. 30, 1973) (evidence indicated that the
organization was spending approximately 20% of its budget on political and legislative activi-
ties).
" 477 F.2d 1169 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd, 416 U.S. 752 (1974).
Id. at 1184 (Wilkey, J., concurring).
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from a smaller organization. 21
In sum, on the basis of the Seasongood" decision and in the absence
of specifically articulated IRS criteria to the contrary, expenditures of no
more than 5% of a diocese's total expenditures for legislative lobbying
could not, in my view, be taken to constitute a "substantial part of the
activities" of the diocese for purposes of section 501(c)(3). And even if such
expenditures rose to as much as 15% of total expenditures the "substan-
tiality" test as applied by the courts would not result in loss of exempt
status.2 3 In addition, any attempt to withdraw the tax exemption of the
Catholic Church for the expression of views on abortion or other moral
issues would raise very grave questions under the first amendment.14
THE FEDERAL REGULATION OF LOBBYING ACT
Most of you will not come in contact with the Federal Regulation of
Lobbying Act, 5 leaving Jim Robinson and Bud Consedine's offices to deal
with the congressional scene. It may be useful, however, to deal briefly with
the federal statute since it has some similarities with many of the state
statutes.
The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act states that it applies only to
any person who "directly or indirectly, solicits, collects, or receives money
or any other thing of value to be used principally to aid, or the principal
purpose of which person is to aid. . ." in the passage or defeat of legisla-
tion by the Congress."6 While Lyndon B. Johnson is reported to have char-
acterized the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act as "more loophole than
law," nevertheless, the Act has of late caused the USCC some concern.
In November of 1973, certain individuals and a group called
"Women's Lobby, Inc." brought suit in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia against Monsignor McHugh, of the Family
Life Division of the USCC, and the USCC itself seeking to enjoin the
USCC and Father McHugh from taking any action with regard to federal
legislation without first registering under the Act. After successfully per-
suading Judge Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr. that a preliminary injunction
should not be granted, we moved for summary judgment. In support of
1, See also Haswell v. United States, 62 Private Fnds. Rpts. 9897, 9903 (Ct. Cl. Oct. 30, 1973).
22 227 F.2d 907.
23 An alternate approach, and the one utilized in the case of NCHLA, would be to form a
separate organization for lobbying purposes and to obtain an exemption for that organization
under § 501(c) (4) of the Code. While the substantial legislative activity proviso does not apply
to organizations exempt under § 501(c)(4), contributions to a 501(c)(4) organization are not
tax deductible. Moreover, the diocese, a 501(c)(3) organization, would still be subject to the
substantial legislative activity proviso with respect to its contribution to the 501(c)(4) organi-
zation.
24 See Note, Religion in Politics and Income Tax Exemption, 42 FORDHAM L. Rzv. 397 (1973).
2 U.S.C. § 261 et seq. (1970).
Id. § 266.
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that motion we relied, inter alia, on arguments that: (1) the exclusive
remedy for enforcement of the Act is by way of criminal proceedings and
no basis had been shown for the court "implying" a civil remedy; (2) since
it is neither a "principal" nor a "substantial" purpose of the USCC nor
Monsignor McHugh to influence the passage or defeat of legislation by the
Congress of the United States, and neither the Conference nor Monsignor
McH*ugh "solicit, collect or receive money" for such purposes, the report-
ing27 and registration 2 provisions of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying
Act do not apply to them by virtue of section 266 thereof;29 and (3) to
construe the Act to require the USCC to register would impair rights guar-
anteed by the first amendment to the Constitution. With its usual dispatch
the district court has had our motion for summary judgment under advise-
ment since January 11, 1974.31
For those interested in the federal regulatory scheme the Act must be
read in light of the gloss placed on it by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Harriss.3 ' In that case the Court, in upholding the constitution-
ality of the Act, held that there are three prerequisites to coverage:
(1) the 'person' must have solicited, collected, or received contributions;
(2) one of the main purposes of such 'person' or one of the main purposes
of such contributions, must have been to influence the passage or defeat of
legislation by Congress; (3) the intended method of accomplishing this pur-
pose must have been through direct communication with members of Con-
gress.3
In interpreting the "principal purpose" requirement of section 266 the
Supreme Court also observed that the quoted phrase "does not exclude a
contribution which in substantial part is to be used to influence legislation
through direct communication with Congress or a person whose activities
in substantial part are directed to influencing legislation through direct
communication with Congress. 3 3 Interestingly, the Court, in footnote 13,
seemed to equate the "principal" or "substantial" purpose test with the
substantial activities criterion in the tax exemption statutes that preceded
section 501(c)(3).
STATE REGULATION OF LOBBYING
Today all of the states have some form of statutory regulation which,
- Id. § 264.
- Id. § 267.
- Id. § 266.
31 On May 21, 1974, Judge Robinson dismissed the complaint in the case of Women's Lobby,
Inc. v. McHugh, Civ. No. 2025-73 (D.D.C.), for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. No appeal was taken by the plaintiff from the decision.
3- 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
32 Id. at 623 (emphasis added).
3 Id. at 622 (emphasis added).
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directly or indirectly, affect individuals or groups who attempt to influence
legislation. 4 While you will, of course, want to consult the particular stat-
ute in your jurisdiction, it may be useful to have a general overview of the
various types of state regulatory schemes.
About half the states have legislation that is limited to defining cer-
tain prohibited acts, e.g., bribery, and imposing sanctions for various im-
proper practices. For example, in most jurisdictions contingent fee lobby-
ing is illegal. Since there is no registration requirement under these stat-
utes and since the prohibited practices are things that none of you would
even consider doing, compliance in these states is a relatively easy matter.
Up until recently at least Minnesota had a statute of this variety. As many
as 16 states have constitutional provisions affecting lobbying. As a rule
these are also provisions dealing with prohibited practices. 5
In other jurisdictions the statutes are similar to the federal act in that
they require that certain formal steps, usually including some form of
registration, be undertaken before lobbying activities may be undertaken.
Registration is usually with the secretary of state, although in some juris-
dictions it is the attorney general or some other designated official. Since
the theory of registration is that publicity of the lobbying activities will
convince the lobbyist to act "properly," all the information filed with state
officials is open to public inspection. The information called for generally
includes name and address of employer, duration of employment, how
much the lobbyist has been paid for his services and what expenses are
included, and what legislation the lobbyist has been hired to support or
oppose. Some states require registration of both the lobbyist and the em-
ployer. Many states require the filing of financial statements in addition
to registration. Several states place a time limit on registration such as
before commencing any lobbying activity or within one week of being
employed.
Some states draw a distinction between "legislative counsels" and
"legislative agents." The former is generally defined as a person who for
compensation appears at a public hearing before any committee in regard
to proposed legislation and the latter is a person who does any other act
with regard to legislation except appear before a committee or activities
that are necessary incidents to such appearance. In some cases only the
legislative agent need register, while in others the distinction appears to
have little significance except with regard to the types of financial reports
that must be filed. A few states require that a specified number of copies
of all written statements provided to members of the general assembly be
filed with designated state officials.
See generally Note, Lobbying-Multi-State Statutory Survey, 38 NOTRE DAME LAW 79
(1962); Annot., Lobbying Regulations, 42 A.L.R.3d 1046.
31 See, e.g., MD. CONST. art. M, § 50.
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Interestingly, the federal act excludes coverage of appearances before
"a committee of the Congress of the United States in support of or opposi-
tion to legislation. 36 And in United States v. Slaughter,37 the district court
held that the Act was not applicable to persons who helped to prepare
witnesses for appearances before congressional committees, either in gath-
ering material, preparing a statement for the witness, or in any other way.
The only state law that I am aware of that specifically refers to church
lobbyists is a California statute which exempts from registration "a person
when representing a bona fide church solely for the purpose of protecting
the public right to practice the doctrines of such church." 3
In general, my view on state registration is when in doubt, register.
As a former prosecutor I can assure you that it is highly unlikely that
anyone would bring a prosecution against an unregistered church lobbyist.
On the other hand, in the wake of Watergate a lot of distasteful publicity
might result were someone to claim that a lobbyist for the Church was
unregistered. As the Women's Lobby case shows, there are people around
who will make such claims.
" 2 U.S.C. § 267(a) (1970).
31 89 F. Supp. 205 (D.D.C. 1950).
See CAL. Gov'T CODE, § 9906(b) (West 1966).
